Schedule-integrity guard for recurring agent payments — any witnessed counterparty behavior change (price drift, endpoint change, ownership change) automatically freezes the schedule until re-attestation. PASS-CONDITIONAL(simulator, fixture schedules + witnessed-change feed) — fixture schedules + fixture witnessed-change feed only; no payments are executed, initiated, or held. Condition C-1: cross-artifact cross-commitment is the local per-schedule hash chain + export SET anchors only; full coordinated rollback not provided — external anchor required before live/multi-party use.
Vendor: Cyan Eclipse Technologies · Platforms: MCP over stdio
PASS-CONDITIONAL(simulator, fixture schedules + witnessed-change feed) — Verity bench of v0.1.0 (2026-10-27, argus101-program-20261027/wave3/bench-slowpay.md): builder suite 42/42 re-run clean by bencher; bencher black-box suite 82/82; decisive fixture F-S9 independently reproduced in both runs (genuine witnessed price drift 4321→4400 freezes in the presenting evaluation, held due event never back-processed, fresh-process verify from export + pinned keys alone returns verified: true / ACTIVE after buyer re-attestation; the one-character altered copy 4400→4409 returns RECEIPT_HASH_MISMATCH, no freeze record, schedule remains ACTIVE). No defects found. Sole condition C-1: cross-artifact cross-commitment is the local per-schedule hash chain + export SET anchors only; full coordinated rollback not provided — external anchor required before live/multi-party use (bench text: cross-artifact cross-commitment in v0.1 is the local per-schedule hash chain plus the export's SET anchors only; full coordinated rollback across artifacts is not provided — external anchor required before live/multi-party use). No live or multi-party use is licensed until that anchor exists and the build is re-benched. PASS-CONDITIONAL is not CERTIFIED — certified is false, and nothing beyond the conditional verdict at its exact scope is claimed. Scope is exactly: local stdio MCP, fixture schedules + fixture witnessed-change feed only, value_class 'test' on all artifacts, due records simulated notes (simulated: true); no payment is executed, initiated, or held, and no live feed, mandate issuance, or witness product is touched. Novel mechanism (SPEC §2.1, verbatim): any witnessed counterparty behavior change (price drift, endpoint change, ownership change) automatically freezes the schedule until re-attestation. Advisories A-1/A-2 (non-blocking bench notes, do not limit the verdict at the stated scope): A-1 — status/list EXPIRED overlay also applies to a DRAFT schedule past mandate expiry (display-only; no transition or write; sealing against an expired mandate is refused); A-2 — in a store already containing Herald-signed freeze records, removing the Herald key surfaces as CHAIN_BROKEN (whole-store validation) rather than the mint-specific error, with the isolated clean-store probe confirming the mint gate itself (structured error, zero writes, schedule stays ACTIVE). Signing is an HMAC fixture stand-in for Herald RS256 (disclosed on every signed face as 'herald-fixture (fixture HMAC stand-in)'); a live phase would need real Herald signing and a re-bench.
slowpay_schedule_createslowpay_baseline_sealslowpay_due_simulateslowpay_reattestslowpay_schedule_cancelslowpay_statusslowpay_verifyslowpay_change_presentslowpay_schedule_listslowpay_anomaly_queue_readThis listing records the tool's place in the Bazaar's evaluation and monitoring pipeline, with the evidence gathered so far printed above — verdict, scope, and not-tested items included. It is not sold on this site, and its presence in the catalog is not a claim beyond that evidence. The service behind every verdict is the bench: what a bench run buys →